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Summer List 5, Sheet 2 
No. 79-1794-CSY 
MICRI.GAN c:- . ...__,_ 
v. 
SUMMERS 
Cert. to Mich. Sup . Ct. (Mood y_ , 
Levin, Kavonagh, Ryan; Wil liams, 
Coleman, Fitzgerald, dissenting) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. Summary. The questions presented are whether police 
violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining the occupant of a 
house on the- premises during the course of an authorized 
search, and whether the exclusionary rule should apply in this 
circumstance. 
2. Facts. On October 10, 1974, a team of Detroit police 
( officers arrived at 9356 Mansfield to execute a warrant for the 
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search of the premises. As they approached the house, the 
officers saw resp leaving. One of the police asked resp 
whether he lived there, and when he replied in the affirmative, 
the officer asked to be admitted. Resp replied that he was 
without his keys, but that he would ring for someone inside to 
open the door. One Dwight Calhoun answered the door, but when 
the police officer identified himself and attempted to enter 
Calhoun quickly shut the door again. The police then broke 
down the door and commenced the search. 
-·---------------~ 
During these events resp had been standing on the porch. 
When police gained entry they required resp to come into the 
parlor of the house and remain there until the search was 
completed. Petr was not frisked. When heroin was discovered 
hidden in the basement, the police searched resp's person and 
-~
discovered a bag of heroin in resp's pocket. Apparently the ~ 
sea·rch warrant did not specifically au thor i ze search of per sons 
on the premises. 
3. Decisions Below. The trial court ordered suppression of 
the heroin discovered on petr's person. The Mich. Ct. App. 
affirmed, and the Mich. Sup. Ct. also affirmed. Relying on 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200 (1979); and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), that 
court concluded that "the seizure of [resp} on the porch and · 
his subsequent detention were not, by nature, limited 
intrusions permissible under Terry and subsequent cases." It 
reasoned that resp's behavior at no time gave police a basis 
for suspecting unlawful activity or fearing for their safety. 






after brief questioning on the doorstep was completed. 
Accordingly, the court held that resp ''was for all practical 
purposes arrested without a warrant when he was 'seized' on his 
front porch, at a time when the police officers did not have 
probable cause to believe that [resp] had committed or was 
committing a felony." Since the heroin was discovered as a 
fruit of this detention, the court held that it should be 
excluded. 
Justice Williams filed a dissent in which two other 
justices joined. The dissenters argued that the proper 
approach was to consider whether the detention was "reasonable'' 
under four criteria: 1) did the case call for a quick decision 
by police? 2) did the officers have reasonable belief that the 
public peace was in jeopardy? 3) was the intrusion reasonably 
related in scope to the perceived need? and 4) was the 
officer's personal safety immediately at risk? Under these 
criteria, the dissenters argued that the decision to restrain 
resp was reasonable and fit within the Jerry standard. They 
particularly stressed the minimal intrusion involved in "merely 
requiring [resp] to cross his own threshold while the warrant 
was being executed," and they expressed the view that police 
safety was implicated under the circumstances. Once resp 
crossed the threshold, the dissenters took the view that 
requiring him to remain in one place until the search was 
completed was reasonably necessary to effectuate the search; 
and they asserted that police have probable cause to arrest the 
owner-occupant of a premises on which there is probable cause 
to believe narcotics is present. 




4. Contentions. Petr argues that the Mich. Sup. Ct. erred 
in requiring probable cause. Petr urges th~ Court to recognize 
an exception from the probable cause requirement for detention 
of the occupant of a premises ~eing searched. Such an 
exception assertedly was recognized in United States v. 
Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (CA 1 1973). Petr relies on the 
dissenting opinion for the proposition . that reasonable 
suspicion was established in this instance. 
Petr next argues a point that was raised in the Mich. Sup. 
Ct. but was not fully discussed. In petr's view, the court 
should have held that detention and search of the occupant was 
implicitly authorized by the warrant. In support of this 
~rgument, petr cites a number of federal appellate decisions 
holding that search of articles (such as bags, purses, 
briefcases, or the like) held by occupants of a house was 
fairly encompassed by a warrant for search of a premises, as 
well as certain state cases allowing search of occupants' 
persons as a reasonable incident of the warrant. See, ~' 
United States v. Micheli, supra; Walker v. United States, 327 
F.2d 597, 600 (CA DC 1963), cert. denied, 377 u.s. 956 (1964); 
Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 305 (CA 5), cert. denied, 
255 U.S. 863 (1957); People v. Pugh, 69 Ill. App.2d 312, 217 
N.E.2d 557 (1966); People v. Kielczynski, 264 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 
App. 1970); State v. Loudermilk, 494 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1972) 
(alternative theory). 
Finally, petr argues ·that resort to the exclusionary rule 
in this case would serve no valid purpose. Cf. Michigan v. 




courts itself indicates that the officers' decision to detain 
and search was not unreasonable, so that exclusion of the 
evidence would have little deterrant effect. 
5. Discussion. The present ~ase is factually 
distinguishable from most of the cases on which petr relies 
because resp was not within the premises at the time when the 
warrant was served, but was forcibly required to enter the 
premises and await the outcome of the search. It was primarily 
this initial detention that the court below found to be 
unreasonable. Accordingly, petr's first and second arguments, 
even if correct for persons present at the time of search, 
would not necessarily resolve this case. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that this factual difference is not of great legal 
significance, as the dissent below concludes. Nor does Ybarra 
v. Illinois fully resolve the issues raised, though it 
generally cuts against petr's position; resp was an occupant of 
the dwelling to be searched, not simply an invitee, and the 
location of the search was a private residence. Petr does 
demonstrate that the lower courts are not in entire agreement 
on how to handle occupants of houses that are searched. t 
recommend calling for a response. 
There is no response. 
7/8/80 Rahdert Op in pet. 
.. 
PS 9/11/80 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: Michigan v. Summers, No. 79-1794 
You asked for a supplemental memo when the response 
in this case came in. Resp makes two basic points: (1) that 
the search warrant for his home did not authorize the police 
to detain him or to search his person, and (2) that any 
independent grounds for searching him personally did not 
appear until after he was illegally detained without probable 
cause during the house search. Resp relies on Ybarra v. 
Illinois for the pr~~Q~ition that a search warrant for 
premises does not autho~ize a search of persons found there. 
Although Ybarra involved a public bar, and this case involves 
P~ I.J..u/r ~a.... /_,,_... ~"_M 1 ---~ 
resp's residence, resp argues that the Fourth Amendment ~ ~
pertains to "persons, not places," and Yb£irra therefore ~ 5 ~ 
controls. As for any probable cause that was furnished b
the discover of heroin in the basement, resp argues that 
this is irrelevant, since the discovery was preceded by an 
illegal detention of him that was not based on probable 
--- ·--------- - -----........._____ 
cause. 
The second issue does not merit review by this 
Court. The Michigan courts concluded that this was a 
significant detention, not a mere Terry stop, and therefore 
required probable cause to arrest. This was apparently 
lacking, although the police did have probable cause, 
confirmed in a search warrant, for the search of resp's home. 
In any event, the nature of this particular detention, and 
the nature of the justification possessed by the police, are 
factual issues that will come up in many cases and need not 
be reviewed now. 
But the first issue--the scope of the authority 
-- ---~--~-------------granted by the search warrant--may be certworthy. The state 
may be correct that a search warrant for premises should 
include searches of the owner of the premises, especially 
when the object sought (drugs) can be concealed so easily in 
clothing. If so, there is probably a correlative power to 
detain the object of such a personal search during the time 
that it takes to look around the house itself. Clearly this 
is a far cry from the Ybarra situation where bar patrons were 
searched merely because they were in the bar at the wrong 
/ 
3. 
time. Here it is the owner of the house whom the police 
searched. 
The cases cited by the state (see the original cert 
memo) evidence a certain amount of confusion over the 
permissible scope of personal searches conducted as adjuncts 
to house searches. It is unclear how the warrant relates to 
containers such as briefcases that may or may not be in the 
physical possession of their owner at the time of the search. 
It is also unclear whether the outcome depends on the status 
of the owner of the container as a resident or a visitor. 
~United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973). 
A third open question involves searches of persons 
themselves, at least persons who reside at the location. Cf. 
United States v. DiRe, 332 u.s. 581 (1948) (dictum) ("The 
Government says it would not conte~~ that, armed with a 
search warrant for a residence only, it could search all 
persons found in it."). 
The state also argues that it would be inappropriate ~ 
in any event to apply the exclusionary rule here ~ecause the ~ 
~ 
officers acted in good faith based on a reasonable view of 
the law. But while it is certainly true in some sense that 
the officers acted reasonably, it is far from clear how the 
retroactivity issue should come out. If there is one, the 
( prevailing assumption seems to be that search warrants for 
buildings do not justify "frisks" of occupants. 
Arguing against a grant is the complicating factor 
..______--.----------~.--~ ··-
that resp was not actually on the premises when the officers ----- --------~-----....,_____--
4. 
arrived to serve the warrant. He was standing in front of 
the house, about to leave. It th z:efor~argued that 
his person is not included in the scope of the warrant, 
although this is perhaps too technical an argument. 
In sum, the Court should consider a grant on the 
---------------'---~-------------is? ue of the permissible scope of personal searches based on ........__  _______......._ 
a search warrant for a given premises. This case would 
provide a useful vehicle for working out the consequences of 
Ybarra when the police are searching a home and are dealing 
with a resident. A subsidiary question would be the power of 
the police to detain a person prior to such a search for a 
considerable period of time. 
September 29, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . ... .............. , 19 . . . No. 79-1794 
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Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No.79-1794 




Also motion of respondent for leave to proceed ifp. Relisted for the 
Chief Justice. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 24, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1794, Michigan v. Summers 
Question Presented 
There are three interrelated issues in this case, and 
it is not clear that the Court will have to address all of 
them. First, may police detain an individual without probable 
cause for investigatory purposes for a period somewhat longer 
than that permitted by Terry v. Ohio? Second, may pol ice 
search an individual found in a house if they have a valid 
search warrant for the house itself? Third, does the 
exclusionary rule apply to good faith mistakes of law? 
2. 
Background 
This case, although difficult and important, involves 
the application of well-known Fourth Amendment cases. I won't 
take your time recounting them. I wi 11, however, review the 
facts of the case. I do so because, as in many Fourth 
Amendment cases, the legal issues do not become clear until the 
factual scenario is firmly in mind. 
Detroit police obtained a warrant authorizing them 
to search for heroin and other narcotics at a dwelling. In the 
accompanying affidavit, an officer stated that an informant had 
purchased heroin from a man named "George" at that address. As 
the pol ice approached, resp was seen leaving the house. An 
officer identified himself, displayed a copy of the search 
warrant, and asked resp if he lived in the house. Resp said 
~---------~~---------------------
that he did. The officer told him to open the front door. 
~
Resp said that he had left his keys inside and would ask 
someone over the intercom to open the door. Co-defendant 
Calhoun appeared at the door. The officer identified himself 
and attempted to open the storm door, which was locked. 
Calhoun then slammed the inside door shut. 
Police then forced the door open. Calhoun was seen 
fleeing toward a downstairs bedroom. One officer brought resp 
inside while another chased and finally caught Calhoun. In 
all, about seven persons were found in the house. They were 
assembled in the living room while the officers searched the 
house. The record does not reveal how long the search lasted. 
In the basement, police found two plastic bags containing 
( 
3. 
narcotics. Resp was arrested when it became known that resp 
owned the house. A search incident to this arrest uncovered 
heroin in resp's jacket pocket. It was this heroin that formed 
the basis for the charge against him. 
Discussion 
There are two key incidents that arguably are 
unconstitutional: (1) the detention of resp in the living 
room, and (2) the search of his jacket. The police have three ~ 
theories, any one of which would permit introduction of the 
heroin. ~ the initial detention was justified by analogy 
to Terry v. Ohio. Police, facing these circumstances, were 
entitled to detain resp for a period of time sufficient for 
investigation. Once the heroin was legally found in the 
basement, pol ice had probable cause to arrest and to conduct 
the search incident to that arrest. ~he police were 
entitled to search resp because he was on the premises that 
lawfully were being searched with a valid warrant. ~even 
if the search was unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable because police made a "good faith mistake of law." 
The Michigan Supreme Court, however, looked at the 
matter differently. It rejected the first argument, concluding 
that Dunaway v. New York requires probable cause for any 
detention longer than the limited intrusion upheld in Terry v. 
Ohio. Because the initial detention was illegal, the 
subsequent search incident to arrest was "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." It also appeared to reject the second 
4. 
argument, concluding that Ybarra v. Illinois established that a 
warrant to search a place does not authorize the search of 
persons found therein. The Michigan Supreme Court did not 
address the third argument. 
1. With respect to Michigan's first argument, I 
conclude that your p~on in this case is governed by your 
opinion last Term in United States v. Mendenhall. You wrote 
that "the reasonableness of a stop turns on . ( i) the 
public interest served by the seizure, ( i i) the nature and 
scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon 
which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his 
knowledge and experience." Slip op. at 2. On the facts in 
Mendenhall, you concluded that, "in light of all the 
\..._....- circumstances," that detention was reasonable. Slip op. at 6. 
I think the police activity in this case should be analyzed 
within your Mendenhall framework. (i) This case, like that 
one, involved drug crimes. (ii) The detention consisted only 
of detaining resp in his home. No questions were asked. There 
< ~.
was no embarrassment such as that associated with a seizure and 
interrogation in a public place. (iii) The police had a high 
degree of information that criminal activity was afoot. A 
judge had issued a search warrant for the house, and resp had 
acknowledged that he lived there. The warrant mentioned that a 
man named "George" was involved in the drug sales. And other 
persons in this house had become frantic at the sight of police 
.. ---- -._........-.... ---
officers. 
•. 
In light of all these circumstances, I think it is 
I / , 
l ' 
5. 
very likely that the police acted reasonably in detaining resp. 
Cf. Mendenhall, slip op. at 6-7. 
There is, however, one critical fact missing from the 
record that we need to know before passing final judgment on 
the pol ice conduct: the length of the detention. The record 
~-----------,--~------
shows only that resp was detained while the house search was 
conducted. If that search took several hours, arguably the 
detention was unreasonable. One possible disposition, 
therefore, is to write an opinion along the lines of Mendenhall 
explicating the proper standard and then remanding for 
additional findings of fact to apply that standard. 
There is, of course, one substantial obstacle to this 
approach: the Court opinion in <una way v. New York. Six 
justices in that case held that nothing less than probable 
cause was necessary to conduct custodial questioning. [You did 
not participate.] It is true that there are substantial -----------factual differences between this case and Dunaway. There, the 
suspect was taken to the police station. Here, he was detained 
at home. There, the suspect was interrogated. Here, police 
asked no questions. But the language of the Court's opinion 
very strongly suggests that, except for the limited intrusion 
of Terry stops, probable cause is required before police may 
detain an individual. 
approach in Mendenhall, 
Court for your theory. 
Dunaway seems inconsistent with your/ ? 
so it seems unlikely that you can get a 
2. I doubt there is merit to Michigan's second 
argument, that a search warrant for a house permits the search 
6. 
of any individuals found within it. This argument seems 
foreclosed by the Court's opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois. The 
Court noted that each occupant of the bar in that case "was 
clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable 
search or an unreasonable seizure. . Although the search 
warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers 
authority to search the premises and to search [the individual 
named in the warrant], it gave them no authority whatsoever to 
invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by 
the tavern's customers." 
To be sure, there are factual differences between 
this case and Ybarra. In a public bar, there is no reason to 
believe that any one patron is connected with criminal activity 
conducted by another patron. In a private dwelling, by 
contrast, there is a nexus between the occupants that tends to 
suggest a common enterprise. But Ybarra stands for a somewhat 
broader theory. I think that individuals possess fourth 
amendment rights that cannot be lost by mere lj>resence at the 
Jl rt\ <VMJ ~~ !UAf \..v~"' 
site of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant • . ~;~ ~ ~. 
3. Michigan's third argument is one very familiar to 
you. Assuming arguendo that the detention and search violated 
the Fourth Amendment, Michigan argues that the exclusionary 
rule should not apply to good faith mistakes of law. The 
search in this case was conducted in 1974. The officers at 
that time had every reason to believe that their behavior was 
lawful, and no deterrent purpose would be served by applying 
the exclusionary rule. 
7. 
The United States, as amicus, makes a slightly 
different argument. It suggests that Dunaway, if applicable 
here, should not be applied retroactively. 
Conclusion 
I conclude that the decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court should be reversed, or at least vacated and remanded. 
But there are several ways you could reach that result. First, 
you could write an opinion along Mendenhall lines that holds 
that probable cause is not necessary if pol ice conduct is 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances. [The problem 
with this is Dunaway, which (without the benefit of your 
participation) seems to have rejected this approach in favor of 
a "bright-line" probable cause requirement.] But if this is 
the way you want to proceed, you probably will have to remand 
'-- -. ------
because the record does not reveal the length of the detention. 
Second, you could hold that the search warrant for 
the house authorized the search of all persons found within it. 
[The problem ~s is Ybarr; , .£i~r~ clear~r~ 
theory.] ~~ ~ ~~-this 
Third, if it is held that the detention and search 
were illegal, you could reverse on the theory that the 
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to good faith mistakes of 
law. Alternatively, as the SG suggests, you could simply hold 
that Dunaway is not to be applied retroactively. 
I recommend trying for a Court under a theory that 
limits Dunaway. If that substantive approach fails, and if the 
8. 
Court deems the search to be illegal, you could try to command 
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From: Mr. Justice Stevens 
C ircula te'Cl: __ MA_Y_1_8_'_8_1_ 
. 1st DRAFT Recirculated· ____________ __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 7~-1794 
State of Michigan, Petitioner, I 0 W . f C . . h n nt o ertwran to t e 
. G vS. Supreme Court of Michigan, 
_ eorge ummers. 
[May - , 1981] 
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant 
to search a house for narcotics, they encountered respondent 
descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in 
gaining entry and detained him while they searched the 
premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascer-
taining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested 
him, searched his person, and found in his coat pocket an 
envelope containing 8.5 grams of heroin.1 
1 The execution of the warra11t is described in greater detail in Justice 
Moody's opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court : 
" Upon arriving at the named address, Officer Roger Lehman saw the 
defendant go out the front door of the house and proceed across t4e 
porch and down the steps. When defendant was asked to open the door 
he replied that he could not because he left his keys inside, but he could 
ring someone over the intercom. Dwight Calhoun came to the door, but 
did not admit the police officers. As a result., the officers obtained en-
trance t o the premises by forcing open the front door. Once admittance 
had been gained Officer Lehman instructed Officrr Conant, previously sta-
tioned along the side of the house, to bring the defendant, still on the 
porch, into the house. 
"After the eight occupants of the hou;;e were detained, a search of the 
premises revealed two plastic bag8 of su:;pected narcotics under the bar in 
the basement. After finding the susperted narcotics in the basement and 
upon determining that the defendant was the owner of the house, Officer 
Conant formally arrested the defendant fo r violation of the Controlled 
79-1794-0PINION 
MICHIGAN v. SUMMERS 
Respondent was charged with possessic:m of the heroin 
found on his person. He moved to suppress the heroin as 
' ' 
the product of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment/ and the trial judge granted the motion and 
quashed the information. That order was affirmed by a 
divided panel of ~he Michigan Court of Appeals, 68 Mich. 
App. 571, 243 N. W. 2d 689, and by the Mi~higan Supreme 
Court over the dissent of three of its justices. 407 Mich. 
432, 289 N. W. 2d 226. We granted the State's petition for 
certiorari, - U. S. ~, and now reverse~ 
I 
The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial 
detention of respondent violated his constitutional right to 
be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person. The 
State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's 
person by arguing that the authority to search premises · 
granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to 
search persons on . those premises, just as that authority in-
cluded an authorization to search furniture and containers 
in which the particular things described might be concealed. 
But as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly noted, even 
Sub~tances Act of 1971. MCL 335.341 (4)(a); MSA 18.1070 (41)(4) (a). 
A CUl>todial search conducted by Officer Conant revealed a pla~tic bag con-
taining suspected heroin in the defendant's jacket pocket. It is this 
heroin, di::;covered on the person of the defendaut, that forms the basis 
of the in<;tant po~::;ession charge." 407 Mich., at 441, 286 N. W. 2d, at 
226-227. 
2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their per::;ons, houses, papers, 
and effects, again~:>t unrea~onable searche8 and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cau~:~e, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de~:~cribing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." . 
'The F()urteenth Amendment requires the several States to secure these 
right:::;. 'See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576; Dunaway 'V. New· 
for.k.~ 442. U •. S. 200, 207 •. 
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if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify th'e 
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described 
in the warrant. See 68 Mich. App., at 578-580, 243 N. W. 
2d, at 692-693. If that detention was permissible, there is 
110 need to reach the question whether a search warrant for 
premises includes the right to search persons found there, 
because when the police searched respondent, they had prob-
- able cause to flo%o.8 The validity of the search of respond-
ent's person therefore depends 'upon a determination whether 
thf! officers had the auth<!rity to require him to re-enter the 
house and to remain there while they conducted their search.4 
3 Becaut:le there w<>re ~everal other occupant~ of the house, under Michi-
gan law tlw evidence that narcotics had been foupd in the batoement of 
r<>t:lpondent';; hout:le would npparently be int:lufficient to support a con-
viction. See People v. Davepm·t, 39 Mich. App. 252, 197 N. W. 2d 521 
(1972) . The Michigan Court of Appeal, relied on Davenport to conclude 
that th<> officer~ did not have probable cause to arretot or search retopondent 
evPn though he wa~ the owner of a house in w\lich contraband was found. 
68 Mich. App., at 580-582, 243 N. W. 2d, at 692-693. .Judge Ba~;hara, 
di~;toenting in the Court of Appeal~, (i Mich. App., at 585, 243 N. W. 2d, 
at 695, and the three di~;toenting ju~;tices of the Michigau Supreme Court, 
407 Mich., at 450, 463--4(i4, 2~6 N. W. 2d, at 231 1 237, pointed out that 
Davenport , which eoucerns the proof nece~to<try to support a conviction, 
i~ uot di~;po~itive of the 4Uei:ition whether the police had probable cause to 
arrest . See Brinegar' · United States, 383 U.S. HiO, 174-176. Regard-
les;, of whether the police had probable eause to arrest respondent under 
Michigan law, probable c·ause within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment i~ not at j):!):!UE' lwre. Re~pondent doe~ not clmllenge the conclu~ion 
that the evidence found iu hi;; home establi~hed probable cause to arret:lt 
him . See Bri<>f for Re~poudent 17. 
d The "seizure" i ~:>~ue in this case bhould uot be confu~ed with the 
"s<>arch" i~:>:me preHf'nted in Yba1'1'a v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85. In Ybarra 
the poliee executing 1~ !<earch warrant for a public tavern detained and 
searched all of the cu~:>tomers who happen<>d to be pre~:><>nt. No question 
concerning the legitimary of the detention was rni~ed . Hather, the Court 
concludNI that the ~:>earch of YLarra was invalid becau~;e the police had 
no rea~:>on to believe he had any ~pecial connection with the premi~:>es, and 
thf' police had llO other basis for suspecting that he was armed or in 
possession of contraband. See 444 U. S., at 90-93. In this case, only th~ 
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II -~J 
In assessing the validity of nesp9n?ent'~n, we note 
first that it constituted a "seizupe'~ ·within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amenqment.5 The State ~oes not contend otherwise) 
and the record demonstrates that 11espondent was not free to 
leave the premises while the officers were searching his home; 
It is also clear that respondent waEj not formally arrested 
until after the search was completed, The dispute therefore 
involves only the constitutionality of a pre-arrest "seizure'~ 
which was admittedly unsupported by probable cause. 
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, the Court re-
affirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person 
must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal ar-
rest is made. In that case police officers located a murder 
suspect at a neighbor's house, took him into custody and 
transported him to the police station, where interrogation 
ultimately produced a confession. Because the suspect was 
not arrested until after he had confessed, and because he 
presumably would have been set free if probable cause had 
not been established during his questioning, the State argued 
that the pre-arrest detention should not be equated with an 
arrest and should be upheld as "reasonable" in view of the 
serious character of the crime and the fact that the police 
had an articulable basis for suspecting that Dunaway was 
involved. !d., at 207. The Court firmly rejected the State's 
argument, noting that "the detentiou of petitioner was in 
detenti011 i~ at i;;sue. The police knew reopouclent lived in the hou;;e, and 
they did not ;;earrh him until after they had probable cau;;e to arrest and 
had done i:'O. 
5 " It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of 
person~:> which do not eventuate· in a trip to the ;;tation hou;;e and protsecu-
tion for crime-'arrest~' in traditional terminology. It must be recog-
!lizcd that whenever a policr officer acco::<tl:l an individual and re;;trains hi$ 
freedom to walk away, he lm::, ';;eized' that per;;on." Terry v. Ohio, · 392: 
u. s. 1, 16. 
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important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." 
!d. , at 212.n We stated: 
"Indeed, any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as 
intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow 
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause. 
"The central importance of the probable-cause re-
quirement to the protection of a citizen's privacy af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment's gua.rantees cannot 
be compromised in this fashion. 'The requirement of 
probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.' 
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959). Hos-
tility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime 
motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, 
and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that 
'common rumor or report, suspicion , or even "strong rea-
son to suspect" was not a.dequate to support a warrant 
for a.rrest.' !d., at 101 (footnotes omitted). The famil-
iar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth 
Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive ex-
perience accommodating the factors relevant to the 'rea-
sonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and 
provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to 
the implementation of a workable rule. See Brinegar 
v. United States, [338 U. S. , at 175-176] ." I d., at 213. 
Although we refused in Dunaway to find an exception that 
would swallow the general rule. our opinion recognized that 
some seizures significantly less intrusive than an a.rrest have 
withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment. In these cases the intru-
6 The Court noted that Dunaway was "taken from a neighbor's home 
to a police car , tran:>ported to a police station, and placed in an interro-
gation room ." He was not informed that !Je was free to leave, he would 
not have been free to !rave and would have bren physically restrained had 
he attempted lo do so. 442 U. S,, at 212. 
19-179~0PINION 
MICHIGAN v. SUMMERS 
sion on the citizen's priv~cy "was se much less severe" than 
that involved in a traditional arrest that "the opposing in-
terests in crime prevention and detection and in the police 
pfficer's safety" could support the seizure as reasonable. ld., 
at 209. 
In the first such case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. the Court 
recognized the narrow authority of police officers who sus-
pect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an in-
dividual's personal security based on les~ than probable cause. 
'l'he Court approved a "frisk" for weapons as a justifiable 
response to an officer's reasonable belief that he was dealing 
with a possibly armed and dangerous suspect.7 In the sec-
ond such case, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143. the Court 
relied on 'Perry to hold that an officer could forcibly stop a 
suspect to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect 
was armed and carrying narcotics.8 And in United States v. 
Briyoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, the Court held that the special 
enforcement problems confronted by roving Border Patrol 
agen~s, though not sufficient to justify random stops of vehi-
7 ln upholding the "fritik" employed by the officer in that case, the 
Court assumed, witj10ut explicitly stating, that the Fourth Amendment 
dorl:l not prohibit forcible stop~; when the officer has a reasonable l:lttl>picion 
that, a crime has been or is being committed. See id., at 32-33 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). !d., at 34 (WHI'l'E, J., concurring). In Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146, the Court made explicit what was implicit 
in 'l'e1"ry : ' 
"A brief stop of a sul:lpicious individual, in order to determine his identity 
or to maintain the statuti que. momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion, may be most reasonable in light of the fact~ known to the officer at 
the time." 
See also United States v. B1"ignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. !:!73; United States v. 
Co1"tez, - U. S. -. 
8 The Court noted that the informant';; tip was insufficient to justify an 
arrest or search based on probable cau~Se under Spinelli v. United f3tates, 
,393 U. S. 410, and Aguilar v. Texas, 37i5 U. S. 108, but, the information 
"carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop. 
'or Williams." 407 U.S., at H7. 
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cles near the Mexican border to question their occupants 
about their citizenship, id., at 882-884,9 were adequate to 
support vehicle stops based on the agents' awareness of spe-
cific articulable facts indicating that the vehicle contained 
illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that the difficulty in pa ... 
trolling the long Mexican border and the interest in controlling 
the influx of illegal aliens justified the limited intrusion, 
usually lasting no more than a minute, involved in the stop. 
ld., at 878-880.10 See alEo United States v. Cortez, -
U.S.-. 
These cases recognize that some seizures admittedly cov-
ered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited in-
trusious on the personal security of those detained and are 
justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that 
they may be made on less than probable cause, so Ion~ as 
police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal ac-
tivity. In these cases, as in Dunawa11, the Court was apply-
ing the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the 
u In several ca~es, the Court has concluded that the absence of any 
articulilble facts available to the officer rendered a detention unrea~on­
ab'e. In Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648, 663, the Court held that 
police could not make random stops of vehicles in order to cheek driven; 
licPnSt'li and vehiclt' rrgistrntiom; in the absence of "articulable and rea-
sonable sulipicion" thnt thP motorist was unlicensed or the cnr unregistereJ. 
In Brown v. Texas . 443 U . S. 47, we held that a statute requiring indi-
viduals to identify them!'elve;; wall uncon;;titutional as applied because the 
police did not have any reasonable su;;picion that the petitioner had com-
mitted or was committing a crime. Finally, in Ybarra v. Illinois , supra, we 
held that police executing a search warrant at a tavern could not invoke 
Terry to friEk a patron unle;;~ the officers had individualized suspicion 
that the patron might be armed or dangerous. 
10 The detention approved in Brignoni-Ponce did not encompu:::s a search 
of the vehicle. The Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
413 U. S. 266, thnt such a ~enrch mu;;t be ;;upported by probable cause. 
ln United States v. Martinez-Fuertt'. 428 U. S. 543, the Court held that 
slop~ at permanent checkpoints involved even less intrusion to a motorist 
t hnn the detention bv th{• roving patrol. aJ1(1 thus a stop at Sll<'h a check:... 
point need not even be hasrd Qll any individualized su:;piclanc. 
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Fourth Amendment.11 They are consistent with the general 
rulE;) that every arrest, and every seizUJle having the essential 
attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is 
supported by probable cause. But they demonstrate that 
the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified ' 
by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the 
momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk 
for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.1~ Therefore, in 
11 In his opinion for the Court in Teh·y, Chief Justice Warren identified 
"the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" a~ "the rea:sonable-
ness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
dtizen's personal security." 392 U. 8., at 19. Before aualyzing the spe-
cific stop and frisk involved in that case, he stated: 
"The scheme of ·the Fourth Amendment becomer:; meaningful only when it 
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing 
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 
judge who must evaluate the reasonablene~:;S of a particular search or seiz-
ure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assesr:;-
ment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective stand-
ard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
or the search 'warrant a man of rea:sonable caution in the belief' that the 
action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
lil2 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96-97 (1964)." 392 U. 8., at 21-
22 (footnotes omitted). 
1 ~ Jm;'1'1CE WRITE, concurring in Dunaway, noted that Terry is not 
"an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable 
cause." Rather, "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ablene;;s-the balancing of competing intere:;t:s." 442 U. 8., al 219 
(WHrrE, J ., concurring). If the purpo:;e underlying a 'Perry stop-in-
ve:;tigating possible criminal activity-i:s to be served, the police must 
under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer 
than the brief time period involved in Terry und Adams. As one com-
mentator observed: 
"It is clear that there are ~everal investigative techniqJ.les which may be 
utilized effectively in the course of u Terry-type ::;top. The most common 
i::; interrogation, which may include both a request for identification and 
inquiry concerning the suspiciou ~:> conduct of the person detained. Some-
times the officer will communicate with others, eithPr police or private 
citizen::;, in an effort to verify the explanation tendered or to confirm lh& 
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9rder to decide whether this case is controlled by the general 
.rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of th~ 
QfficiaJ ~utru~ion and its justificativn. 
III 
Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact 
that the police had obtained a warrant to search responde~t's 
house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate 
had found probable cause to believe that the law was being 
violated in that house and had authorized a substantial in-
vasion of the privacy of the petsons who resided there. 'The 
detention of one of the residents while the premises were 
searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on hi~ 
liberty. was surely less intrusive than the search itself.18 
Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens-unless they 
intend flight to avoid arrest-would elect to remain in order 
to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the 
type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by 
the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more informa-
tion, because the information the officers seek normally will be 
identification or determine whether a person of that identity is otherwise 
wanted. Or, the suspect may be detained while it is determined if in fact 
an offense has occurred in the area, a process which might involve checking 
certain premises, locating and examining objects abandoned by the suspect, 
or talking with other people. If it is known that an offense has occurred 
in the area, the suspect may be viewed by witnesses to the crime. There 
is no rea::;on to conclude that any investigative methods of the type just 
listed are inherently objectionable; they might cast doubt upon the 
reasonableness of the detention , however, if their use makes the period of 
detention unduly long or involves moving the suspect to another locale." 
3 W. LaFave, Searc4 and Seizure§ 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978). 
13 "As the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the 'physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment i::; directed.' United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297, 313. And we have long adhered to the view that the warrant proce-
dure minimizes the danger of needless intrusion:; of that sort." Payton v. 
Ne·w York~ 4:45 U.S. 573, 581h586. 
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obtained through the search and not through the detention.14 
Moreover, because the detention in this case was in respond-
ent's own residence, it could add only minimally to the public 
stigma associated with the search itself and would involve 
neither the inconvenience nor the inqignity associated with a 
compelled visit to the police station.~5 In sharp' contr~tst to 
the custodial interrogation in Dunaway, the detention of this 
respondent was "substantially less intrusive" than an arrest. 
442 U. S., at 210.16 
In assessing the justification for the detention of an oc-
cupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant 
to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement interest and 
the nature of the "articulable facts" supporting the detention 
are relevant. Most obvious is the legitimate law enforce-
ment interest in preventing flight in the event that incrim-
inating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes of 
greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of 
harm to the officers. Although no special qanger to the 
police is suggested by the evidence ~n this record, the execu-
tion of a. warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of trans-
action that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts· 
to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the· 
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers ro•·tinPly 
ex r· rcise unquestioned command of the situation. Cf. 2 W. 
14 Professor LaFave ha~ noted that the reasonableness of a detention 
may bc.> dcte··mined in part by " fw-lhether the police are diligently pur-
:miPg 11 mean~ of irn·estigation which it> likely to resnl --e the matter one 
way or nnothrr rrry ~oon ... " 0 W. LnFnve, Se:tr~h aPd Seizure § 9.2, p. 
40 (1978) . 
15 J\IorE'ove:>r, unlike the s~izurE' in Du.,away, which was designed to pro-
\'idr an opportunity for inte~rogation and did lead to Dunnway's cC1nfes-
bion , the ~rizwe in this rnsE' is rot likPiy to haw roerri\·e aspects likely to 
jndu "e >'elf- incrimination. 
10 WP do not Yi:-w the fart that rP~pnndc.>nt wns JeaYing his house when 
the rffi " rr~ nr ived lo bE' of roPstitutional signifiranre. Th c.> oeizurr of 
r~spond0nt on the sidrwalk outside was no more intrusive than the de---
!t~ntiQn of t.h nse re~id_ents of the ltou~r that the police found inl'ide. 
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LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9, pp. 150-151 (1978), 
Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be 
facilitated if the occupants of the premises are pre€ent. 
Their self-interest may induce them to dpen locked doors or 
locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only 
da.maginp: to property but may also delay the completion of 
the task at hand. 
It is also appropriate to consider the nature of the articu-
la.ble and individualized suspicion on which the police base 
the detention of the occupant of a home subject to a search 
warrant. We have already noted that the detention repre-
sents only an incremental intrusion on persona.! liberty when 
the sea.rch of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant. 
The f'xistence of a search warrant, however, also orovides an 
objective justifiration for the detention. A judicial officer 
has determineu that police have probable catJse to believe 
that someone in the home is committing a crime. . Thus a 
neutral magistrate rather than an officer iq the field has made 
the critical determination that the police should be given a 
special a.''thorization to thruRt themselves into the priva{ly 
of p, hom3.17 The connection of an occupant to that home 
17 Justice Jarkson recognize(} the :oignificance of this determination in 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealou~ officers, is not that it deniel,'! law epforcement the support of the 
USI.ja] inferences which rea;;onable men draw from evidence. Its protection 
con~ibts in requiring that those inference~ be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate in~tead of bejng judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any a~umption that 
evidence sufficient tp support a magi~trate':,; di~intere~:~ted determination 
to i~sue a search warrant will justify the officers ill making a search with-
out a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the 
people's homes ~Secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime, 
even in the privacy of one's own quarter;; is, of cour;;e, of grave concern 
to society, and the law allows such crime to be reuched on proper showing. 
The right of olficer~; to thru~;t themselves into a home is al:;o a grave cou-
ce~, not only to the individual hut to a society which chooses to dweU 
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gives the police Qfficer an easily identifiable and certa.in basis 
for determining that suspicion of c~imin11l ~:~-ctivity justifies a 
detention of that occupant. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, we held th~tt police 
officers may not enter a private residenc~ to make a routine 
felony arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In that c&se 
we rejected the suggestion that only a search warrant could 
adequately protect the privacy interests at sta.ke, noting that 
the distinction between a search warrant and an arrest war-
rant was far less significant than the interposit-ion of the . 
magistrate's determination of probable cause between the 
zealour. officer and the citizen: 
"It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may 
afford less protection than a sea.rch warrant requirement, 
but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determi-
nation of probable ca.Pse between the zealous officer and 
the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's 
particioation in a felony to pen;;nade a judicial officer 
th~tt his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally rea~on­
able to reonire him to ooen his doors to the officers of 
the law. Thus, f0r Fourth Amendment purposes, an ar-
rest warrant founded on probable cause imolicitly carries 
with it the limited authority to ent'-'r a dwelling in which 
the suspect lives when there is ref!son to believe the sus-
pect is within." 445 U. S. , at 602-603. 
That holding is relevant today. If the evidence that a citi-
zen's res:d .,nre is harboring colltraband is sufficient to per-
suade p, judicial offirer tha.t an invasion of the citizen's 
privary is jPstifi"d, it is constitutionallv reasonable to require 
that. citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid 
in reasonablP security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of 
priyar:v must rea~onably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be· 
derided by a judicial officer, not by u policeman or government enforce:.. 
ment ·agent ." (Footnote~; omitteCl.) 
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warrant to search his hotne.18 Thus, for Fourth Amend .. 
ment purposes, we hold thftt a warrant to search for contra-
band 19 foun~ed on probable cause implicitly carries with it 
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises 
while a proper search is conducted.2Q 
Because it was lawf~l to require respondent to re-enter and 
to remain in the house until evidence establishing p~obable 
cause to arrest him was found, his "rrest and the search in-
cident thereto were constitutionfl,lly permissible. The judg-
ment of the Supreme Court · of Michigan must therefore be 
I 
reversed. . 
It is so ordered. 
18 In refu~ing to approve seizures based on less than probable cause, 
the Dunaway court declined to adopt a "multifactor balancing te.st of 
'reasonable police conduct under t!1e circumstances' to cover all seizur~ 
that do not amount to technical arrests." The Court noted: 
"The protections intended by the Framers could all too easily dit~appear 
in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances pre-
sented by different cases, especially when that balancing may he done in 
the first instance by police cfficel'~> engaged in the 'often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.'" 442 U. S., at 213. 
As JUti'l'ICE WHJ'I'E noted in his concurrence in Dunaway, if police are 
to have workable rules , the balancing of the competing inter~ts inherent 
in the Terry principle "must in huge part be done on a categorical basis-
not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officer~>." 442 
U. S., at 219-220 (WHITE, J., concurring). The rule we adopt today 
does not (lppend upon such an ad hoc determination, bzcause the officer 
i~ not required to evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying detention 
or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. 
19 We do not decide whether the same rffiult would be justified if the 
search warrant merely authorized a search for evidence. Cf. Zurcher v. -('j) 
Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 560. See also id., at 581 (S'l'EVENA J., 
dissenting). 
20 Although special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, 
might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual ca~e, we are persuaded 
that thi~ routine detention of rffiidents of a house while it was being 
searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a case. 
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Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your letter commenting on Part III 
of my proposed opinion. I would agree, of course, that 
either consent or exigent circumstances might justify 
the detention of the occupants of a house that is being 
searched without a warrant, but in this case I do not 
believe either of those justifications would be 
sufficient. Since the result in other cases may well 
turn on the specific facts, I am inclined to think it 
would be unwise to til to gr~~t when the 
justification would e adequate and when not. For 
example, if a homeowner answers the door and consents 
to an entry by the police, would it necessarily follow 
that they could detain other residents of the house 
while they conducted a search within the limits to 
Which the consent applied? Or, if they were in hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon who took refuge in a house, 
is it clear that they could detain other occupants who 
might have no connection with that person? In sum, I 
would rather wait for cases of that kind before trying 
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.§u.prtntt <!faurl af t~t ~tb .§tattg 
1!icurfrittghm. ~· <q. 2.0,?J!..;l 
May 19, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1794 Michigan v. Summers 
Dear John: 
I am certainly in general agreement with the printed 
opinion you circulated on May 18th, and my concerns 
reflect more those of "omission" than "commission". In 
Part III of your opinion, beginning on page 9, although 
you do not make it in terms the exclusive basis for 
detaining the occupant of the premises, I think that 
part could be read as virtuallt requiring a warrant issued 
b~rutr~" as t e necessary b as1s fo""r any 
detent1on. It seems to me that exigent circumstances, 
which have always been an excepti~n ttr ~  require-
ment and some of which are mentioned in that part of your 
opinion, as well as consent of the type found in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamante, 412 U.~8 (1972), would each justify 
the pollee conduct here. It may be that I am simply mis-
interpreting Part III of your opinion, but from my first 
reading of it it seems to be an unduly narrow justification 
of the police authority to temporarily "freeze" the 
status quo under the circumstances present here. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Stevens 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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'J)!ra.s-Irittghtn, ~. <!):. 21lbiJ!.~ 
May 20, 1981 
Re: 79-1794 - Michigan v. Summers 
Dear Lewis: 
Pursuant to our conversation, which was prompted 
by Bill Rehnquist's letter and my response, I should 
think the addition of the following footnote on page 10 
should take care of the problem: 
"17/ The fact that our holding today does not 
rest on any special circumstances does not, of 
course, preclude the possibility that comparable 
police conduct may be justified by exigent 
circumstances in a proper case. No such question, 
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May 20, 1981 
Re: 79-1794 -Michigan v. Summers 
Dear Lewis: 
Pursuant to our conversation, which was prompted 
by Bill Rehnquist's letter and my response, I should 
think the addition of the following footnote on page 10 
should take care of the problem: 
"17/ The fact that our holding today does not 
rest on any special circumstances does not, of 
course, preclude the possibility that comparable 
police conduct may be justified by exigent 
circumstances in a proper case. No such question, 
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May ·21, 19 81 
Re: 79-1794 - Michigan v. Summers 
Dear John, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
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May 21, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1794 Michigan v. Summers 
Dear John: 
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CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 3, 1981 
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.JUSTICE w .... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. June 11, 1981 
RE: No.79-l794 Michigan v. Summers 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stewart 
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